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Abstract
What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and per-
sonal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour
among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human
capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver
of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the
default “Hobbesian” rules of the “game of life”, determined by physical/environmental
constraints, into self-created rules of social organisation where cooperation can be indi-
vidually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include
rules of food sharing in hunter-gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in
agriculturalists, property rights, and systems for sharing reputation between medieval
traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, pro-
viding direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that
sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language,
and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how co-
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2operative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This
allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-
reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social
organisation.
Keywords: cooperation; institutions; division of labour; human evolution; trade; punish-
ment
Introduction
Life on earth has undergone a series of major evolutionary transitions in which individuals at
a lower level of biological organisation came together to form higher-level units [1]. Examples
include replicating molecules coming together to form protocells, single-celled individuals
evolving into multicellular organisms, and solitary insects transitioning into eusocial colonies.
The final transition proposed by Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry [1] is the origin of human
societies. Yet while the other major evolutionary transitions are starting to become well
understood [2, 3], there is a lack of a cohesive theory that can explain the transition from
primate social organisation based on kinship and personal exchange to human societies with
large-scale impersonal exchange and division of labour between unrelated individuals.
Human societies do indeed largely meet the criteria for a major evolutionary transition
[3]. For example, just as epigenetic inheritance (a novel inheritance mechanism) allows the
cells in a multicellular organism to differentiate and profit from a division of labour, so
language (a novel cultural inheritance mechanism) allows human individuals to coordinate
and specialise in different tasks, and so also to profit from a division of labour. Similarly,
while by most measures a multicellular organism is more complex than a single cell, so
human chiefdoms are more complex than hunter-gatherer bands in terms of the number of
hierarchical levels of organisation [4]. And just as multicellular organisms with division of
labour and sterile somatic cells gradually evolved from single-celled ancestors, so cultural
phylogenies (based on language trees) point to states evolving gradually from chiefdoms,
which in turn evolved gradually from hunter-gatherer macro-bands and tribes [4].
We propose to subdivide the major transition to large-scale human societies into four
distinct, smaller transitions (Fig. 1). (1) The origin of the human hunter-gatherer niche,
characterised by large but hard to acquire food packages, allomaternal care, and egalitarian
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strongly facilitates cumulative cultural evolution and negotiation between individuals. (3)
The Neolithic revolution, which involved the shift to agricultural and sedentary populations
with hierarchical social organisation. (4) The origin of states, where interactions regularly
occur between non-kin who may never meet again.
We will assume that the first transition, from a largely vegetarian primate living in fission-
fusion societies in woodland landscapes, to a savannah-living partly carnivorous cooperative
hunter type of living, was made possible by changes in social organisation not unlike those
seen in other lineages that ended up adopting a combination of cooperative breeding and
hunting (e.g. [5]). Our focus here, then, is on explaining the transitions in social organisation
subsequent to the emergence of language. Current estimates place the origin of modern-like
language at either less than 100 kya or at around 500 kya, with the older date being the
most plausible [6].
From an economic point of view, the major transition is from an initial state of autarky
in which group members do not typically exchange resources with each other, to one of
catallaxy where there is extreme division of labour and hence interdependence between
group members. In non-human primate social systems, each individual produces itself most
of the resources and technology it needs to survive and reproduce. By contrast, while hunter-
gatherer individuals can typically still each produce their own technology, they are reliant
on the sharing of food with other individuals in order to survive. Finally, in large-scale
human societies individuals rely on trade with non-kin for nearly all of their vital resources,
and an individual will not always itself possess the entire knowledge necessary to produce
any single piece of technology.
Here we develop the hypothesis that the human capacity to form institutions was a
key driver of the transition to large-scale societies (and may indeed be necessary for their
formation). Institutions (sensu [7]) are human-devised mechanisms for generating the rules
of social interactions . Through communication and negotiation, humans can transform the
rules of their “game of life”. The game of life depends on two kinds of constraints. The first
kind consists of exogenous biotic and abiotic factors that cannot be changed by individuals at
the time they are interacting [7, 8]. These factors include the laws of physics and the current
environment, which comprises for example the current total resource endowment and the
individuals’ state of technology. The second type of constraints are behavioural in nature and
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or expanding behavioural options. By creating institutions, individuals can change the rules
aspect of their social interactions, thereby increasing some possibilities without foreclosing
others, and potentially tipping the balance from a situation where defection is individually
advantageous into one where it pays to cooperate [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. As we will discuss below,
theoretical work in economics has formally demonstrated conditions under which this can
occur even in arbitrarily large groups of unrelated individuals where participants meet very
infrequently [10, 11, 12].
Humans can create these institutions because they possess various cognitive features
that are lacking in other primates, and that are necessary to devise and enforce institutional
rules. These include shared intentionality, strong inhibitory control, and a willingness to
seek out mutual opportunities. We explain below how these skills evolved as a result of the
adoption of cooperative breeding early in the Homo lineage. Once in place, they could then
be co-opted for institution formation.
In the remainder of this paper, we first define the term institution more precisely, before
delineating their costs and benefits, and discussing the cognitive prerequisites necessary for
their evolution. We then discuss how the institutional-path hypothesis can explain the key
steps of social evolution from hunter-gatherers with language to large-scale states.
Institutions
What is an institution?
In general the outcome(s) of an individual’s behaviour, in terms of its fitness consequences
and/or material rewards, depends upon the behaviour of other individuals as well as on
exogenous biotic and abiotic factors. In game theory [13, 14], a game form defines the
behavioural options – the “strategies” – available to each individual, and the relationship
between strategies and outcomes. The game form thus specifies the rules of social interac-
tions or, in other words, the “rules of the game”, which is usually and casually referred to
in evolutionary biology as a game. More particularly, in game theory, a game consists of a
game form and the preferences of individuals over alternative outcomes, and thus allows the
equilibrium strategies to be determined [13, 14]. In evolutionary biology, strategies are often
5(but not always) assumed to be genetically or culturally inherited, in which case it is directly
the evolutionary process and not the preferences that determine equilibrium strategies.
When individuals can communicate with each other, and when the strategies consist of
messages, a game form is often called a mechanism [7]. We follow Hurwicz [7] in considering
that an institution is a mechanism whose outcome is a game form. The hallmark of an
institution is a sequence of at least two sets of social interactions:
1. Active genesis of institutional rules through communication and bargaining by the
individuals in a group (or subset thereof).
2. Economic interactions whose outcomes are material, and which are affected by the
institutional rules.
An institution thus consists of a political game form, which determines the rules of the
subsequent economic interactions (Fig. 2). These two types of interaction are likely to
take place on very different timescales. In particular, the political game form is likely to
be played much less frequently than the economic game form. For example, the economic
game form will likely be played many times in a single generation, while the institutional
rules may only change once every several generations. The rules of the political game
will also themselves be set by rules generated by another game form [7], referred to as a
“constitutional” game form by Ostrom [15, p. 59]. This constitutional game form will in
turn be played even less frequently. Finally, the rules of the constitutional game form will
themselves be set by a “meta-constitutional” game form, but this series of rule-generating
game forms eventually begins with the unchangeable rules of the biophysical world, and
terminates with the economic game form that generates material payoffs [15]. Because our
focus is on the distinction between generating rules versus playing the economic game form,
for simplicity we consider only one political game form and one economic game form.
A more all-encompassing and formal definition of institutions than that given above
exists (most notably the one by Hurwicz [7, p. 128]), but for our purposes it is enough to
see an institution as a mechanism involving communication whose outcomes are rules of
interactions. Non-linguistic animals are probably unable to produce institutions involving
many individuals, even though they play economic games, because they are unlikely to
autonomously generate institutional rules through communication.
The assemblies in modern hunter-gatherers that discuss resource allocation rules or what
6would be adequate norms of behaviour provide a good example of an institution as defined
above. We stress that the institution comprises the negotiation process as well as the
resulting norms or rules of behaviour [7, p. 128]. This is in contrast to the cultural evolution
literature, which equates institutions with equilibrium norms of behaviour in an economic
game form [16], rather than with a political game form that generates rules for the economic
game form.
The benefits of institutions
The formation of institutional rules can transform the “Hobbesian” rules (or default rules) of
the game of life into different rules that lead to more cooperative outcomes, but why is this?
Since interactions are localised, it is important to realise that social life in hominins largely
consists of a repetition of interactions that involve coordination or cooperation problems.
For repeated interactions, the fundamental folk theorem of game theory [13, 14, 17] tells
us that cooperation can ultimately be sustained in an equilibrium by conditional strategies
that respond to players’ past actions (reciprocity).
Specifically, in an indefinitely long sequence of interactions where individuals value future
payoffs and cannot completely hide their actions, any strategy that guarantees a payoff at
least as great as the minimax payoff in the underlying stage game can be an equilibrium
[13, 14, 17]. The minimax payoff is the largest payoff that an individual can receive if its
opponent tries to minimise the individual’s payoff – in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it would be
the payoff received when the opponent defects. Therefore, if any individual deviates from
the equilibrium strategy, then its payoff can be reduced to the minimax payoff by its co-
players. Consequently, it does not pay an individual to deviate from a strategy that gives
more than its minimax payoff. This logic applies even to groups of infinitely large size where
an individual does not interact twice with the same partner, provided that there is a way to
transmit sufficient information about the past behaviour of partners [10, 18], i.e. reputation.
It also applies to interactions where N -players interact simultaneously [19], such as repeated
collective action problems.
There are potentially three kinds of issues that can limit the application of the folk
theorem to sustain equilibria with high individual material payoffs. Each of these can be
addressed by institutions. The first potential problem stems from the fact that there are
7infinitely many equilibria with some level of cooperation [17, 20]. But many of these equi-
libria will give payoffs that are hardly any better than the minimax payoff, while others will
result in much greater payoffs. If individuals act independently, then they have no means
to guarantee that they will coordinate on an equilibrium that gives high individual payoffs,
and are likely to settle on the “default equilibrium” determined by the default Hobbesian
rules of interactions (Fig. 3). Institutions can resolve this problem, because they provide
a means for individuals to amalgamate dispersed information about resources and wants,
and hence coordinate their actions to reach an equilibrium that gives higher payoffs than
the default equilibrium (Fig. 3). By devising rules of interactions individuals settle on an
equilibrium, transforming the social contract (in the sense of [17, 20]) from one that gives
only the payoff of the Hobbesian equilibrium, to one where the benefits of cooperation are
achieved.
The second issue is that individuals need to value future payoffs, and the game needs
to be indefinitely repeated. Institutional rules can help to make these conditions hold. For
example, Casari [21] describes the development of institutional rules to govern the use of
common agricultural land in the Italian Alps, between 1200-1800 AD. The rules which most
villages ended up adopting tied families and their future descendants into the group, by
requiring that the sale or purchase of rights to use the communal land was subject to a
majority vote amongst the other villagers. This ensured that individuals would then care
about their future payoffs, and that there was no simple way to end the game.
The third issue is that individuals need to have sufficient information about the past
behaviour of other individuals, a problem which becomes all the more pressing as group size
increases. Institutional rules can help to alleviate these problems by facilitating the spread
of information between group members. For example, extant groups managing common-
pool resources from irrigation systems to shared grazing lands make agreements to appoint
individuals to act as monitors, and regularly hold assemblies of all group members to share
information [9, 21]. Institutional rules that resolve social dilemmas also typically create
centralised repositories for storing information about the reputation of group members,
which was common for merchants in medieval Europe [10, 12]. The right institutional rules,
then, can create an environment in which the Folk Theorem can sustain equilibria that give
high individual material payoffs [22].
Institutional rules are typically not imposed externally, but are the result of a political
8game form. Experiments have repeatedly found that individuals placed in social dilemmas
and allowed to communicate achieve better outcomes than if they are not allowed to com-
municate [23]. Those using communication both to agree on a joint investment strategy and
to choose their own sanctioning system achieve results close to the group’s optimum ([23],
see also [24]). Field studies have illustrated how institutional rules, designed by resource
users themselves, allow for the self-organised management of irrigation [25, 26, 27], fishing,
and harvesting systems [9]. For example, in the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, institu-
tional rules specify how much water each user may take at a given time, how responsibilities
for maintenance of the system are shared, and what the sanctions are for individuals that
break the rules. These rules are not imposed externally but are created by assemblies of the
irrigators themselves, and indeed have been for a thousand years [9].
Critically, and contrary to cultural group selection arguments (e.g. [28, 29, 30]), insti-
tutional rules in these situations create an economic game form in which monitoring and
sanctioning are not altruistic (sensu evolutionary biology [31]). Rather, field studies have
demonstrated that successful institutional rules create conditions that provide direct bene-
fits (sensu evolutionary biology [31]) to individuals that actively monitor and enforce them
[9, 10, 12, 22, 32]. As such, in contrast to altruistic punishment [29, 33], they do not require
high genetic or cultural relatedness between group members.
For example, Ostrom describes how extant small-scale societies incentivise group mem-
bers to monitor each other, by allowing individuals that discover a cheater to keep a pro-
portion of the fine levied on that cheater [9]. And as an example in larger-scale societies,
in medieval Europe the Law Merchant system of institutional rules was developed, where
individuals could pay a cost to register non-cooperative acts by their partner with a judge.
They could also pay a cost to query the system to see whether their trading partner had
any disputes registered against them before transacting [10, 12]. Judges could impose a fine
on cheaters, but had no means to force individuals to pay this fine. Nevertheless, if a fine
was imposed then it was in the trader’s own interests to pay it in order to maintain a good
reputation with the Law Merchant, and so be able to reap the benefits of cooperation with
other individuals in future. Consequently, this system of sanctioning was self-enforcing, even
though traders could not be compelled to pay a fine, and had to finance the Law Merchant
system themselves [10].
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Creating self-enforcing institutional rules is a costly process. First, there are costs to set-
ting up a self-enforcing system of monitoring and sanctioning, such as paying judges in the
Law Merchant system. Second, time and energy must be spent on negotiating the rules.
While this can be done in face-to-face discussions after sunset in hunter-gatherer groups,
negotiation becomes much more costly as group size increases. Indeed, it cannot be over-
stated how difficult it is to agree on something in a group. Arrow’s impossibility theorem
[34] says that there is no satisfactory way of making social decisions once individuals have
sufficiently different preferences. As a result, institutional arrangements that need a high
level of consensus between group members may be inherently unstable whenever individuals’
endowments and allegiances shift over time, or when there is a turnover of players. Finally,
some individuals may exert disproportional influence in the political game form, driving
the creation of rules that favour themselves at the expense of others. The cooperation and
coordination achieved under the institutional rules needs to provide sufficient benefits to
offset all of these costs, and thus improve on the payoff from the Hobbesian equilibrium
(Fig. 3). Nevertheless, the fact that we see cooperation-promoting institutions in the real
world implies that this condition can in principle be met.
The uniqueness of institutions in humans
We emphasise here the uniquely human genesis of institutional rules: the explicit and coordi-
nated construction of group-wide rules that regulate social interactions and that are enforced
by other group members. This contrasts in a fundamental way to the usual mechanisms for
social interactions considered in evolutionary biology. Other organisms can indeed condition
their behaviour on the actions of other individuals (e.g. reciprocity), and they can modify
their environment over time (niche construction, [35]). Other animals also perform social
learning, imitating traditions of other group members such as bird songs or techniques to
open nuts. But crucially, we are aware of no other species that over one individual’s lifetime
can construct arbitrary rules to regulate social activity, and then enforce these rules by co-
ordinated sanctioning (see also [36] for a similar argument about the uniqueness of human
culture).
For example, consider the institutional rules of marriage, the details of which are par-
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ticular to any one society. At first sight, the reproductive strategy of monogamy adopted
by many animals may seem to be the same. But this is not so, because the institutional
rules of marriage regulate what counts as marriage, what the necessary preconditions for it
to occur are (e.g. the payment of dowries), who may marry who, how a marriage may be
terminated, etc. These rules are necessarily recognised and followed by many individuals,
and violations are enforced by coordinated sanctioning. In other words, they define what is
normative, and they change the rules of the social game by changing the mapping between
individual strategies and the corresponding outcomes, i.e. the payoff matrix. By contrast,
monogamy in the animal world is simply an individual unilateral reproductive strategy that
is not regulated by rules and enforced by societal sanctioning, and so which does not change
the rules of the underlying social game.
The cognitive requirements of institutions
It is difficult to see how individuals could play the political game form without certain
cognitive faculties that are unique to humans. Institutions involve individuals bargaining
over rules to structure their social interactions. This means that they first need to be able to
foresee alternative social contracts, and then communicate and negotiate over them in order
to improve over the default Hobbesian rules. This requires at least three types of advanced
cognitive features. (1) To devise alternative rules of interactions, individuals need to be
able to create virtual worlds. This requires planning, imagination, causal understanding,
large working memory, and the ability to anticipate future rewards. (2) To communicate and
bargain efficiently over their rules of interactions, individuals need language and a motivation
to seek out information and knowledge, have shared intentionality, and a fully developed
theory of mind. (3) To reach consensus, individuals need a strong willingness to seek out
mutual opportunities, as well as strong inhibitory control.
These abilities are only partially present in other primates. Why is this? After all, other
primates have large brains [37] and relatively well developed cognitive faculties. The answer
is that many of the traits require at least some degree of prosocial motivations. Prosocial
motivations are lacking in extant great apes, from which we can infer that they were also
lacking in the common ancestor of the great apes and Homo. In the next section, we present
a hypothesis for why prosocial motivations evolved in our lineage, and hence why our lineage
evolved a social cognition that could later be co-opted for the formation of institutions.
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From primate autarky to human catallaxy
The hunter-gatherer niche before language and institutions
Elements of the hunter-gatherer, or forager, niche were gradually assembled over the past
2 million years or so, but details necessarily remain sketchy. Because language must have
affected this niche (see below), we will try to reconstruct what it looked like before language
arose, based on comparative evidence and on the archaeological and fossil records.
It is known that by the time good documentation of Homo erectus is found, at ca. 1.8
million years ago, the basic elements of hunting and gathering were in place [38]. We can
infer aspects of the social system [39], including bonding among males (collective defence
against large carnivores and subsequent collective acquisition of meat) and male-female
friendships (as found in primates in very large groups, e.g. [40]). Large meat packages
inevitably meant wider sharing, including with females and immatures. The latter would
have increasing difficulty supporting themselves, given the increasing reliance on technology
or endurance running, and thus probably required energy inputs from others. Finally, their
large brain size, well above the so-called grey ceiling for hominoids [41], suggests energy
inputs for reproducing females. In other words, Homo erectus showed many elements of
extensive allomaternal care [5], i.e. cooperative breeding.
Comparative studies show that cooperative breeding changes the psychology of primates,
and indeed other mammals such as elephants and African wild dogs, when compared to their
non-cooperatively-breeding sister taxa [42]. These studies imply that cooperative breeding
selects for a high social tolerance and prosocial motivations, leading to a marked increase
in socio-cognitive abilities [42, 43]. What is unique in Homo is that cooperative breeding
and the consequent prosocial psychology were added on top of an already existing large-
brained ape-like cognitive system, inherited from our earlier hominin (australopithecine)
ancestors. This created the potential for a more advanced social cognition than that seen
in other cooperatively breeding species. One especially pertinent feature of an ape cognitive
system is an ability to understand mental states in other individuals. In great apes this
ability seems to only be used in competitive contexts [42]. But when prosocial motivations
co-evolved with cooperative breeding in the Homo lineage, this existing ability to grasp
mental states could start to be used in cooperative contexts. Ultimately, this culminated in
the evolution of shared intentionality [42], i.e. the sharing of psychological states between
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individuals. Shared intentionality in turn underlies many of the other cognitive prerequisites
for institution formation, including the use of language to share information [44].
Hunter-gatherers after the advent of language
The origin of language is a complicated and well-studied area, which we do not address
directly here. However, we note that once it evolved, language had two key consequences
for hunter-gatherer social evolution. First, language made teaching more effective, which
provided more scope for cumulative cultural evolution and hence the development of new
technologies [45, 46]. Second, once in place language enabled individuals to negotiate their
rules of social interactions; that is, to start to create institutions for the first time. These
two elements came together to produce greater cooperative division of labour among post-
language hunter-gatherers.
With the advent of new complex technologies, such as poison-tipped arrows, nets, and
traps, it became possible for individuals to hunt large game in much smaller groups than
before. Because hunting large game is inherently unpredictable, having multiple hunting
parties within a social unit would provide benefits to wider food sharing as an insurance
scheme. Even the best hunters benefit from sharing because this reduces the variance in
their own and their offspring’s daily calorific intake [47]. The improvements in safety and
hunting ability led to the break-up of the old group into smaller subgroups, now called
bands or camps. But crucially the reputational effects of language allowed bonds to remain
strong among camps of the same community, as shown by frequent moves between them.
And increasing returns to scale would provide an advantage to sharing with a larger number
of individuals, for example by allowing individuals to overproduce food items that they
found easy to obtain and exchanging them for other items. Thus, fewer hunters per party
supported by a sharing system could massively reduce variance in an individual’s yield [48].
Language made it possible for the sharing networks to become larger and therefore more
stable.
Anthropological studies have shown that individuals in extant hunter-gatherer groups
consistently devise and use institutional rules to regulate this kind of food sharing. Indeed,
extant hunter-gatherers spend much of their time discussing rules of sharing and gossiping
about violations of these [47]. In other words, they negotiate institutional rules and enforce
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these themselves. Examples includes rules that specify who receives what part of a kill and
what quantity [36, 49], with defectors being punished by a variety of means from public
ridicule through to ostracism and execution [50]. While some other primates do practise
some degree of food sharing, they do not have non-dyadic systems of food sharing which
are regulated and enforced by impartial rules that apply to everyone in the group [48].
This suggests that institutional rules are necessary to regulate such systems of sharing [47],
and hence that the supporting institutional rules co-evolved with extended food-sharing in
hunter-gatherers after the advent of language.
Hill [36] gives many more examples of institutional rules in extant hunter-gatherer soci-
eties. These include rules concerning access to mating partners within the groups (prohi-
bitions and prescriptions on the basis of age, kin, or ritual membership), polygyny (degree
allowed and who may practice it), regulation of violent conflict within and between groups,
and rules regulating political power (rules of turn-taking in discussions, and rules govern-
ing who will be the leader for different social activities). Institutional rules also affect life
history, by specifying who must give resources to juveniles.
During the Upper Paleolithic, we also see the emergence of long-distance trade and
division of labour beyond food sharing. Evidence for this includes the remains of materials
that had been transported hundreds of kilometres from their origins, and the development
of new tools that were specialised in performing specific tasks [51]. Trade would have been
strongly favoured by the presence of institutions, because already back then it required
a mechanism by which individuals could make faithful promises to invest in labour that
would only become useful when the finished product was exchanged. While doing this, the
individual would produce less food, which would necessitate the pre-existence of rules for
food sharing. Finally, the efficiency of long-distance trade would have been greatly enhanced
by an institution for using some type of (pre-numismatic) money. The existence of art and
other forms of symbolism suggest that Upper Palaeolithic humans had the cognitive abilities
to do this [51].
An important question concerns how institutional rules were formed in Palaeolithic
hunter-gatherers. In other words, what did the political game form look like? Modern
hunter-gatherer groups spend much time discussing institutional rules and violations of
these around the camp fire after sunset [50]. Furthermore, observations of these groups
show egalitarian political interactions. Individuals typically take turns to give their opin-
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ions during group discussions [50]. The role of leaders seems to be to help the group to reach
a consensus, rather than to force their own opinion upon others, or to benefit materially.
Moreover, ethnographic evidence suggests [50], and archaeological evidence confirms [52],
that status was not hereditary in these ancient mobile hunter-gatherers. This egalitarianism
likely evolved and was maintained by a combination of high degrees of social interdependence
in obtaining and defending resources, and the creation of lethal weapons that reduced the
effects of physical differences in strength between would-be dominants and subordinates [53].
Moreover, it would be difficult for any one individual to monopolise meat from large game.
Thus, although each individual should be expected to try to craft institutional rules that
benefit itself, the egalitarian social structure would have prevented any one individual from
being able to benefit itself too much at the expense of the rest of the group. Consequently,
the political game form was likely to take the shape of a mechanism that aggregated the
preferences of all group members [54], without resulting in too much dissent.
The origin of agriculture, large social groups, and hierarchy
The origin of agriculture was likely made possible by many factors [55], including the sta-
bilisation of the earth’s climate during the Holocene. However, successful agriculture would
have necessitated the expansion of the domain of regulation by group institutions. It would
require new property rights, to ensure that an individual could not simply have his plants,
animals, land, or stored food taken by others [56]. Agriculture would also require institu-
tional rules to prevent the overexploitation of land and other common pool resources [9, 21].
Groups would also face new social dilemmas brought about by new, shared technology,
such as the construction and usage of irrigation systems [57]. The existence of institutions
therefore placed humans in a unique position to benefit from agriculture.
It is plausible that institutions aimed at solving these problems co-evolved with the de-
mographic expansion of human groups brought about by agriculture. If cooperation prob-
lems were solved, then larger group sizes could potentially benefit individuals through both
economies of scale (increasing returns in material payoff as a function of population size,
[58]) and economies of scope (increasing returns in material payoff due to variety, not size,
[59]). The logic of this has been demonstrated in a formal model of the co-evolution of
demography with institutions to regulate irrigation [60]. The results were that groups with
institutional rules that successfully solved collective action problems grew to a larger size,
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and spread their institutional rules to other groups through excess migration.
However, as humans shifted to intensive modes of subsistence, the political game form
itself started to change [61]. With the advent of storage technologies, it became possible
for some individuals to start to build up a surplus of resources and form patrilineal clans
for their defence. Permanent agriculture, especially irrigation systems, would have tied
individuals to their group, making it hard to escape a despotic leader. The result was that
agriculture triggered a shift from egalitarianism back to despotic social structure. Despotic
leaders that commanded surpluses of resources would then be able to influence institutions
for their own good at the expense of other group members, in a way that they could not
have done previously in an egalitarian structure. For example, leaders could dominate the
political game form and skew the economic rules in their favour by enforcing (with coalitional
support) what proportion of surplus resources from irrigation farming they could keep for
themselves rather than share with the rest of the group [62, 63]. Consequently, the shift to
intensive food production heralded a transition to coercive and non-egalitarian institutions,
or so-called extractive institutions [64].
The origin of states and large-scale markets
Agriculture ultimately led to the emergence of multiple levels of hierarchical organisation –
states. In a state the individuals just below the leader in the hierarchy each specialise in just
a subset of the tasks of the ruler [65]. The creation of specialised authority roles represents
a new institution, i.e. a new political game form that determines the rules of the economic
interactions of commoners.
The archaeological evidence shows that the first states arose by the aggregation of previ-
ously independent groups, rather than by one group simply expanding in size and displacing
its neighbours [66]. At least two types of between-group interactions are implicated in
driving this aggregation: warfare and trade [66]. The role of warfare is quite intuitive: ag-
gregation can happen by one polity forcing another to become subordinate to it. The role of
trade is often seen as creating ties between chiefs, through the procurement and exchange of
prestige goods (e.g. [67]; see [68] for a review). However, there is also evidence that staple
goods were traded over long distances during the Neolithic [69]. Indeed, institutional rules
regulated trade during the Neolithic [68]. Trade would be most reliable, and have lower
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transaction costs [70], with those others that were playing by the same institutional rules.
Institutions could therefore provide a pressure for groups to aggregate into a larger polity
in order to reap the gains of economies of scale and scope from trade.
In modern states, division of labour is so pronounced that individuals are critically de-
pendent on others outside their family and close friendship circles for food, as well as for
protection from the myriads of hazards encountered during their lifespan. These vital ele-
ments for reproduction and survival are often supplied by decentralised competitive markets.
This arrangement results in a “mutual dependence among strangers” [71] where there is a
remarkable level of trust among interacting individuals, which appears to be as uniquely
human as language.
The central problem behind the functioning of any market, and more generally any
large-scale society, is that no one has complete information [72]. The rewards of competitive
exchange thus seem unachievable without institutional rules that guarantee at least secure
property rights, and that enforce the various structural characteristics of information flow in
markets [17]. Furthermore, not all markets can be efficient because resource allocations made
at the individual level often result in externalities, i.e. the effects of an individual’s action
can spill over into the environment and negatively affect other individuals, creating a tragedy
of the commons situation [73]. This forces groups to design institutional rules that regulate
any spillover on the environment, such as the medieval Law Merchant that facilitated trade
between strangers by spreading information about their past behaviour [10]. Indeed, the
quality of institutional rules has been proposed as being the single main determinant of
whether modern nations will succeed or fail. Acemoglu & Robinson [64] distinguish between
institutional rules that are inclusive, meaning that they provide incentives to individuals
that reward them for their productivity, in contrast to extractive rules that reward only a
few individuals and that fail to adequately protect property rights.
Discussion
Institutions, the individually devised communication processes that produce rules to struc-
ture social interactions, are evolved (extended) phenotypes that fundamentally rely on lan-
guage. They are key determinants of, and may be necessary to explain, the last major
evolutionary transition.
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In economics, institutions are often thought of as being formed by individuals with un-
bounded levels of cognition; that is, individuals following the neoclassical rational choice
assumptions [70, chapter 3]. But preferences for forming institutions, and for institutional
rules, can also evolve by processes of cultural evolution [60]. Consequently, institutions can
be formed by individuals that have only bounded rationality (like probably any hominoid),
as long as institution formation increases an individual’s own payoff, or their inclusive payoff
or fitness. Our hypothesis for the emergence of large-scale societies relies on self-created and
self-enforcing institutional rules, which regardless of the exact level of rationality/cognition
of the individuals involved, provide direct benefits from cooperation and coordination. Under
self-enforcing institutional rules cooperation, and monitoring and sanctioning are adaptive
at the individual level.
There are at least three alternative hypotheses for the evolutionary origin of large-scale
human societies. The first rests on individuals performing biased social learning, espe-
cially conformity-biased learning, whereby individuals tend to imitate the most frequent
behaviours within their group. This creates high cultural relatedness within groups, and
thus enables cultural group selection [74]. Although the conditions under which this really
works remain unclear [75, 76, 77], a very low level of rationality is implicitly assumed, since
individuals are assumed to be unable to compute when it would actually be advantageous
to express shirking behaviours instead of to conform [78]. Consequently, in contrast to the
institutional-path hypothesis, the biased-social-learning hypothesis entails that cooperation
is often maladaptive at the individual level. Yet although experiments show that human
infants develop a propensity for unconditional helping by the age of two, by the age of
three they start to become influenced by the past behaviour of their partners [79]. In other
words, as they develop children do start to take account of the expected benefit when de-
ciding whether to cooperate. Such individually-beneficial cooperation is expected under the
institutional-path hypothesis. Interestingly, this is the same age at which children start to
normatively enforce the rules of artificial games in the laboratory [80].
Moreover, because the cultural evolution literature has essentially ignored the possibility
of humans playing a political game form, it has implicitly assumed that the rules of the
economic game form cannot be changed by a process operating within groups. As such,
the cultural evolution literature has concluded that rules can only change by a slow and
external process of between-group competition, rather than being variable in the short term
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through internal negotiation. But this conclusion does not fit well with the large brains and
advanced planning and negotiation skills of our species.
The second alternative hypothesis presupposes the formation of coercive hierarchy, which
results from strong asymmetries in physical strength or power within groups (Fig. 1). Coali-
tions of powerful individuals (elites) are able to coerce others when surpluses, as produced
by agriculture, are large enough to be exploited. They may increase this coercion as groups
expand in size through monopolising resources gained through conflict with other groups
[81, 82]. This ultimately results in elites creating coercive states through conquest [83]. Un-
der this hypothesis, individuals may still behave in their self-interest when coerced, but the
social equilibrium will be far from one that gives a high payoff to the majority of individuals.
The third alternative hypothesis (the “interdependence hypothesis”) is based on the idea
that cooperation in early humans was mutualistic, with individuals becoming highly de-
pendant on each other through the scavenging of the carcasses of large game, which later
extended into cooperative hunting [84]. This required the development of shared intention-
ality, and then other advanced socio-cognitive features such as language, in order to ensure
successful coordination in high risk Stag-Hunt game situations. The high interdependence of
individuals, combined with the possibility of partner choice, provided an incentive for indi-
viduals to use reputation when deciding whether to cooperate with an individual. However,
this kind of cooperation was threatened as group size expanded, party due to the problem of
knowing the reputation of other group members. It is hypothesised that this problem lead
to the adoption of group-wide norms and conventions, and symbolic markers as proxies for
reputation [84].
There are clearly strong connections between all these hypotheses, and several ele-
ments of them are not mutually exclusive. Both the biased-cultural-transmission and the
institutional-path hypotheses rely fundamentally on cultural evolution, and thus involve
social learning. The main difference is the conception of rationality that individuals are en-
dowed with. Under the institutional-path hypothesis individuals are assumed to have high
levels of cognition and rationality (see section “The cognitive requirements of institutions”),
enough at least to respond adaptively to their social environment and reinforce individually
beneficial actions under most circumstances. But it does not at all require conformity- or
prestige-biased transmission. While conformity is surely important in humans and other
primates, we also know that humans are flexible with their investment in cooperation de-
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pending upon the context [78, 85, 86], and that there is strong within-culture variation in
the social learning strategies that individuals employ [87]. The institutional-path hypothesis
better fits with these findings, by not requiring within-group homogeneity of behaviour or
preferences.
Having institutions also does not exclude hierarchy and dominance. If hierarchical com-
mand is an efficient mode to solve economic problems as group size increases [88], then the
voluntary creation of hierarchy and leadership is exactly what we expect to see in the long-
run under the institutional path hypothesis. The political game form can then subsequently
change into one of dominance, where the new leaders take advantage of the costs of resisting
or dispersing to create institutional rules that benefit themselves at the expense of others
[62, 63], paving the way to extractive institutions. However, coercive hierarchy seems to be
inherently unstable [89] and costly to maintain, given the possibility for subordinates to form
coalitions. Moreover, extant small-scale societies demonstrate that egalitarian institutions
can resolve social dilemmas in irrigation and other agricultural problems, and often do so
more effectively than coercive institutions [9].
Finally, both the institutional-path and interdependence hypotheses agree that human
cooperation first emerged through direct an indirect individual benefits in small groups.
But the interdependence hypothesis argues that the mechanisms supporting this must have
broken down in large groups, leading to the use of conformity, group-wide norms and con-
ventions, and symbolic markers as proxies for reputation. However, this hypothesis does not
provide an account of how particular group-wide norms and conventions would be adopted.
By contrast, under the institutional-path hypothesis institutional rules continue to provide
direct benefits to cooperating even in large groups, and are created by a political game form.
We conclude that the key puzzle about large-scale human societies is not how to explain
the existence of altruistic cooperation that is costly and fitness reducing over an individual’s
lifetime, as has been widely suggested [90]. Instead, the puzzle lies in understanding how
the institutional rules that provide lifetime direct benefits to cooperation and coordination
are generated and sustained over both short and long times scales. From a theoretical
perspective, there is a need for further modelling work on the evolution of institutional rules.
From an empirical perspective, future work should investigate further how the cognitive
prerequisites for creating institutions evolved, and what the exact level of rationality required
is. It should also examine the role of the co-evolution of trade and warfare with institutions,
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and the concomitant rise of large-scale societies.
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Figure legends
Figure 1: Sub-transitions of the major transition from small- to large-scale human societies,
with the major triggers for subsequent changes indicated, as well as crude estimates of the
timing of these transitions. Solving the collective action problems inherent in large-scale
agriculture may or may not have involved coercion depending on the society (e.g. over
management of irrigation [25, 57, 91]). However, the surpluses provided by agriculture
eventually led to hierarchal institutions that were prone to collapse and be reformed [89],
culminating in the first states ca 4 kya.
Figure 2: An institution is a mechanism of communication whose output is the rules for
economic interactions. As such one is in the presence of a political game form, where the
preferences of group members for institutional rules are expressed, followed by an economic
game form. The political game form could give equal weight to the preferences of all group
members, as in egalitarian institutions, or could give more weight to dominant individuals,
as happened with the origin of agriculture. The result of the political game form is the
rules (or game form) for the subsequent economic interactions. The economic interactions
determine the fitness or material rewards to individuals, and may for example be a variant
of a public goods or coordination game, or an exchange economy where goods are traded.
Figure 3: In the absence of institutions, individuals that engage in repeated social in-
teractions are likely to receive only the payoff corresponding to the default or Hobbesian
equilibrium of the game of life (see also [8]). However, when group members can commu-
nicate and negotiate an agreed coordination mechanism (i.e. create an institution), they
can coordinate in the economic game form on an equilibrium that potentially increases their
mutual payoff relative to the Hobbesian equilibrium (shaded area, see also [17, 20]). The
resulting equilibrium strategies are self-enforcing, in the sense that it is both individually
advantageous to follow them when others are doing so, and individually advantageous to
sanction group members that do not follow them. Although this figure shows a group of
two individuals for illustration, the size of the shaded area and thus the benefit of having
institutions actually increases with the number of interacting individuals. This is because
the problems of coordinating on an equilibrium without institutions increase with group size
[88].
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